Tagged: grand jury

Prof. Gershman Questions Rosenberg Prosecutors

In his most recent Huffington Post blog post titled Did the Rosenberg Prosecutors Suborn Perjury?, Prof. Gershman raises a question about prosecutors suborning perjury based on the recently released grand jury testimony of David Greenglas, Ethel Rosenberg’s brother and prosecution’s witness. It is a fascinating read – check it out! 

Update: Proceedings for a Special Prosecutor in Ferguson

As we reported last week, a hearing was held on Friday, May 29 on the motion for appointment of a special prosecutor in Ferguson. After a contentious discussion the Judge Joseph L. Walsh III agreed to consider the expert affidavit of Prof. Bennett Gershman on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury.

Gershman complained about a “gross deviation from proper standards of conduct,” saying he never before saw prosecutors go to “extraordinary lengths to exonerate a potential defendant.”

Proceeding Seeking a Special Prosecutor in Ferguson

This Friday, May 29, 2015, a hearing will be held in Missouri State Court in the matter of  State of Missouri ex inf. Montague Simmons, et al., v. Robert McCulloch, St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney, seeking appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the St. Louis County Prosecutor’s conduct in the grand jury in State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson  (previously discussed here). The Wilson matter arose from the death of Michael Brown. After a grand jury presentation, the grand jury failed to indict Officer Wilson in the death of Mr. Brown.

Missouri has an interesting statute, Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 106.220–106.290, that allows a private citizen to bring an action for an investigation to determine if a sitting prosecutor’s conduct  constituted a failure to perform the duties of his public office. If so found, a special prosecutor would be appointed with authority to file a writ of quo warranto action seeking ouster of the sitting prosecutor from office.

The motion is supported by the affidavit of Prof. Bennett Gershman, from Pace Law School, who addresses the questions of serious misconduct in the presentation of the case to the grand jury.

Related Readings:

NY Court of Appeals Issues an Opinion on Depraved Indifference

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

The New York State Penal Code provides serious penalties in situations where a defendant’s reckless conduct toward others manifests “depraved indifference to human life” and exposes a victim to “a grave risk of death.” When these elements can be proven and the victim dies as a result, a defendant can be subject to conviction for second-degree murder, pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2) (McKinney 2015). When the victim does not die, the defendant can be subject to conviction for reckless endangerment in the first degree, pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25 (McKinney 2015).

In an opinion issued on February 19, 2015, the N.Y. Court of Appeals addressed the latter situation in the case of People v. Williams, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 01486 (Feb. 19, 2015). In this case, a prosecutor pursued a first-degree reckless endangerment charge against Mr. Williams because he did not disclose the fact that he knew he was HIV positive to a male partner with whom he had unprotected anal intercourse on several occasions and because Mr. Williams responded affirmatively to his partner’s questions about whether it was safe to engage in unprotected sex. The defendant’s partner subsequently became very ill, was diagnosed as HIV positive, and was put on a lifetime regimen of medications to stave off AIDS.

As noted in my previous post, in recent years the Court of Appeals has restricted the application of depraved indifference charges, finding that prosecutors often pursued such charges when not merited. Of particular relevance to the recent Williams case is this Court’s decision in People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 844 N.E.2d 721, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267 (2005) holding that when a defendant’s reckless conduct endangers only one person, a prosecutor must show that the defendant exhibited “wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness directed against a particularly vulnerable victim, combined with utter indifference to the life or safety of the helpless target of the perpetrator’s inexcusable acts.”

In Williams, the grand jury returned an indictment on one count of first-degree reckless endangerment, N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25, and on one count of third-degree assault, N.Y. Penal Law § 120.00(2) (McKinney 2015). Upon defendant’s motion to dismiss both counts arguing legally insufficient evidence, the Supreme Court denied the motion as to the assault charge but reduced the reckless endangerment charge from first degree to second degree. The prosecutor appealed and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed holding that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support proof of the mental state requirement of depraved indifference and (2) given favorable medical advances in treatment of HIV positive patients, the defendant’s conduct did not expose the victim to a grave risk of death.

On further appeal, several civil rights, public health, and HIV advocacy organizations submitted, or joined in, amicus briefs supporting the defendant. The Center for HIV Law and Policy, on behalf of itself and several other groups, argued in its brief that “[u]sing the criminal law to prosecute and penalize people living with HIV for conduct that would be legal if they did not get tested or know their status reinforces prejudice and undermines important government-funded HIV testing, treatment, and prevention efforts.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Fourth Department’s decision and held that although it had no doubt that “defendant’s conduct was reckless, selfish and reprehensible,” the evidence presented to the grand jury was insufficient to support a prima facie case that the defendant acted with depraved indifference. Reviewing the testimony presented to the grand jury, the Court found that there was no evidence that “defendant exposed the victim to the risk of HIV infection out of any malevolent desire for the victim to contract the virus, or that he was utterly indifferent to the victim’s fate.”

Given its holding on the failure of proof regarding the required mental state element, the Court of Appeals explicitly declined to address the “grave risk” element of whether, in light of modern medical science, HIV infection creates a grave risk of death.

Related Reading:

More on Grand Juries and the US Justice System

On December 5, 2014, as part of the HuffPost Live, Pace Professor of Law and Director of the Pace Criminal Justice Institute Lissa Griffin joined Roger Fairfax, Professor of Law at George Washington University, and the host Josh Zepps for a live discussion about the role and function of grand juries in the US justice system. Josh Zepps introduces the segment by saying that

[i]n the span of two weeks, two grand juries have failed to indict cops involved in the death of unarmed black men. Most counties don’t even have grand juries. Why do we? How do they work? And what can be done to fix our flawed legal system?

The two guests explain what grand jury is, how it operates, how it decides to indict, the role of the prosecutor during grand jury proceedings, and the lack of judicial involvement during this stage. The discussion further progressed to consider comparative perspectives, including the French, German, and English indictment procedures.