Tagged: Freedom of Information Act

Federal Prosecutors Encroach Upon Attorney-Client Communications

The protection of the attorney-client privilege has become less sacrosanct in our criminal justice system. Government practices to encroach upon the attorney-client relationship have become more invasive and widespread than ever before. For example, the prison email system has become a blueprint for maximizing the government’s leverage in interfering with one’s right to counsel and to deviously induce waivers of the attorney-client privilege.

Recently, a Federal Court in Brooklyn (EDNY) has upheld the troubling practice of federal prosecutors searching for incriminating evidence (i.e. admissions) by reading emails between defendants and their attorneys sent through the prison email system (“TRULINCS”). The government had claimed that the practice of reading all inmate emails was solely the result of a lack of financial funding, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“FBOP”) cannot afford to incorporate a screening system that would separate inmate emails to attorneys. Prosecutors failed to mention, however, that federal inmates must actually pay to use the prison’s email and telephone systems, and that the recipients of such communications must be pre-approved by the FBOP. The FBOP generally creates a list of approved contacts for each inmate, and maintains a copy of such list within its database. The list not only identifies each of the inmate’s approved contacts, but also notes each contact’s relationship with the inmate (i.e. Spouse, Friend, Attorney).

Nevertheless, the Court found that federal prosecutors could legally review inmate emails with lawyers, because federal inmates receive prior warning that their communications will not be treated as privileged and must accept those terms prior to using the email system provided by the FBOP. The Court also noted that the FBOP’s failure to provide a privileged form of email communication does not infringe upon an inmate’s right to counsel, since inmates could still privately access their attorney through other forms of communication.  The Court observed that inmates are provided sufficient alternative means to engage in privileged communications with lawyers by phone calls, mail, and in-person visits.

What the Court’s opinion fails to appreciate, however, is that email communication is the most efficient and viable form of communication used by lawyers in the twenty-first century. The suggestion that inmates could use other forms of communication to contact lawyers in the federal system is simply fantastical, especially for inmates seeking to access their lawyers for post-conviction matters.

Indeed, email communication may be the only viable way for an inmate to effectively communicate with a lawyer, since the FBOP designates inmates to be housed throughout the nation without regard to the jurisdictional location of their conviction. In post-conviction matters, attorneys may be required to travel across the country in order to conduct a legal visit with a client, which may pose significant financial and practical burdens on both the inmate and the attorney’s law practice. Likewise, the FBOP mailing system inherently poses significant delays in the transmission of communications (i.e. prison mailbox rule), and prison counselors usually require an attorney to provide notice weeks in advance before even approving an inmate’s request for either a legal visit or legal telephone call.

Notably, there appears to be a split amongst the courts in Brooklyn as to whether the government’s unfettered practice of reading attorney-client emails over “TRULINCS” can continue to occur. In a Medicare Fraud prosecution, Federal Judge Dora Irizarry of the Eastern District of New York ordered the government to refrain from reading the defendant’s prison emails with his attorneys. Judge Irizarry rejected the government’s claim that it was too expensive or burdensome for the FBOP to separate emails, noting that the practice was truly controlled by the government’s interest in gaining an adversarial advantage:

That’s hogwash… You’re going to tell me you don’t want to know what your adversary’s strategy is? What kind of a litigator are you then? Give me a break.”

In the end, allowing the government to review communications between inmates and their lawyers is a destructive and unethical practice. There is simply no justification for allowing this dangerous practice to continue, and the feeble excuses offered by federal prosecutors are simply unavailing. Unfortunately, the government’s encroachment upon attorney-client communications diminishes a criminal defense lawyer’s ability to provide effective representation. Indeed, a inmate’s ability to engage in the continuous flow of privileged communications with an attorney is paramount to the development of the attorney-client relationship, and the cornerstone to the lawyer’s ability to provide effective representation in both pre-trial proceedings and post-conviction matters.

It is to be hoped that the government’s position will at least remain consistent when astute criminal defense lawyers begin seeking the disclosure of all prison email communications between the prosecution’s cooperating witnesses and their lawyers, federal attorneys, and FBI Agents in either pre-trial discovery motions or by Freedom of Information requests.  Only time will tell whether federal prosecutors truly believe that prison emails between an inmate and an attorney can never be protected by the attorney-client privilege, and will freely accede to defense requests under its Brady and Giglio obligation. 

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Second Circuit Targets “DOJ White Paper” in Sanctioned-Killings

A three-judge panel for Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recently ordered the United States Government to release portions of a Justice Department memorandum (“DOJ White Paper”) that purportedly contains classified information regarding the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. In 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki, a United States citizen alleged to have joined Al Qaeda forces, was killed during a targeted drone strike in Yemen. His killing, along with some other alleged terror suspects, were sanctioned by the United States targeted-killing program in the “War on Terror.”

In New York Times Co. v. Dep’t of Justice, the Court ruled that partial disclosure of the “DOJ White Paper,” sections setting forth the government’s reasoning as to lawfulness of its targeted killings of United States citizens carried out by drone aircraft, was justified given the government’s public statements discussing Awlaki’s death. The court observed that senior Government officials had undertaken

an extensive public relations campaign to convince the public that [the Administration’s] conclusions [about the lawfulness of the killing of al-Awlaki] are correct.

The court further concluded that such limited disclosure would not impinge upon any attorney-client privilege matters between the government and the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, nor would disclosure risk “any aspect of military plans, intelligence activities, sources and methods or foreign relations.”

In a prior editorial, the New York Times noted that the “DOJ White Paper” was of monumental importance to help settle the significant legal debate that has transpired since the targeted-killing program was made public. Many legal scholars have long awaited the release of the “legal reasoning” that has been drummed up by government officials to justify the targeted-killing program. Many scholars have remained skeptical of the government’s analysis, and have wondered whether it is ever lawful for the government to conduct targeted killings of American citizens, observing that the targeted-killing of any United States citizen may inherently contravene

executive orders banning assassinations, a federal law against murder, protections in the Bill of Rights and various strictures of the international laws of war.

Last year, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon denied the request of the New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union to obtain an unredacted version of the Justice Department’s memorandum pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. In response to the District Court’s ruling, the ACLU expressed that

[t]his ruling denies the public access to crucial information about the government’s extrajudicial killing of U.S. citizens and also effectively green-lights its practice of making selective and self-serving disclosures.

At the time, ACLU deputy legal director Jameel Jaffer also suggested that the “targeted killing program raises profound questions about the appropriate limits on government power in our constitutional democracy.” Jaffer advocated that the memorandum should be unsealed, because “[t]he public has a right to know more about the circumstances in which the government believes it can lawfully kill people, including U.S. citizens, who are far from any battlefield and have never been charged with a crime.”

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