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POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

In a June 26, 2014 decision, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously held that the evidence at trial supported Appellant Oliverio Galindo’s conviction for possession of a loaded firearm outside his home or place of business, pursuant to Penal Law § 265.03(3). But the Court was divided, 5-2, on whether his conviction pursuant to Penal Law § 265.03(1)(b) for possession of a loaded firearm with the intent to use it unlawfully against another person was in accordance with law.

Critical to this issue was Penal Law § 265.15(4), which states that “[t]he possession by any person of any … weapon … is presumptive evidence of intent to use the same unlawfully against another.” This presumption is permissive, not mandatory. But if the prosecution establishes the predicate fact (weapon possession), the presumed fact (unlawful intent) becomes part of the prosecution’s prima facie case, which the jury may rely on, with consideration of any rebuttal by the defense.

It was undisputed that on a public street Galindo shot his cousin in the leg. But the evidence regarding Galindo’s intent in regard to this shooting was much less clear. The defense did not present evidence, but argued that the statutory presumption of unlawful intent was rebutted through testimony presented by a prosecution witness who reported that Galindo told him that Galindo shot his cousin accidentally (i.e., not with unlawful intent).

Because Galindo challenged his intent-related conviction as insufficiently supported by the evidence (and not as violating due process), the Court reviewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the People. The majority interpreted the statutes as not requiring the People “to prove that defendant specifically intended to use the gun unlawfully against [his cousin] or any particular person.” The majority thus held that even if the evidence “may have suggested that defendant did not intend to use the gun unlawfully against [his cousin], it was not inconsistent with the inference that he intended to use the gun unlawfully against someone other than his cousin.” (emphasis in original). Therefore, the evidence relating to Galindo’s shooting of his cousin (whether unlawful or accidental) was essentially immaterial, except that it established the predicate fact of weapon possession, which then permitted the jury to presume Galindo’s intent to use the gun unlawfully against anyone, whether identified at trial or not.

Judge Pigott, in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Judge Lippman, concluded that “[g]iven the lack of any evidence, direct or circumstantial, concerning defendant’s intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another, the jury could not have rationally concluded that the defendant’s mere possession of a loaded firearm established his intent to unlawfully use it against another.” (emphasis in original).

Responding to this, the majority said, “[b]ut that is exactly what the Legislature intended Penal Law § 265.15(4) to permit a jury to do: find that a defendant intended to use a weapon unlawfully merely because he or she possessed that weapon.” (emphasis added)

The Galindo majority did not fully address the constitutionality of Penal Law  § 265.15(4) because defendant did not raise this issue on appeal. Nevertheless, both the majority and dissent referenced County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), a habeas case in which a sharply divided Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of another New York statutory presumption. In Allen, the element statutorily permitted to be presumed was possession of a firearm attributed to any and all persons based on the predicate fact that they were occupants of an automobile when a firearm was found in the vehicle.

The Allen majority held that the proper constitutional test requires consideration of whether the fact to be presumed is “more likely than not to flow from” the statutory predicate facts. The majority stated that this standard (lower than beyond a reasonable doubt) is appropriate for permissive presumptions “[a]s long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt.”

The four Allen dissenters found the statutory presumption unconstitutional and stated that “an individual’s mere presence in an automobile where there is a handgun does not even make it ‘more likely than not’ that the individual possesses the weapon.”

In Galindo, the fact permitted to be presumed was intent to use a weapon unlawfully. The Court of Appeals interpreted section 265.15(4) to support a finding of this mens rea element even in cases in which there was no evidence supporting a finding of intent other than the predicate fact of possession.

In light of the above, the Court of Appeals may need to address the constitutionality of Penal Law  § 265.15(4) in a future case.

References:

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POST WRITTEN BY: Daphne Holmes*

Technology helps law enforcement agencies and justice personnel stay one step ahead of criminals, furnishing new ways to detect and prevent crimes, as well as helping prosecutors convict offenders. And since emerging technology is available on both sides of justice, the cat-and-mouse game between perpetrators and police is never-ending, requiring continual adjustments from law enforcement agencies.

The good news for public safety is that crime rates have generally decreased over the past two decades, due in part to advancements in crime detection and deterrent technology. Since effective policing leans heavily on the rapid sharing of sensitive crime-related data; the recent explosion in information technology is a positive development for law enforcement agencies. Identification technology, social media, and mobile capabilities also enhance public safety, enabling justice staff to do their business more efficiently and respond to unfolding investigations in real-time.

While technology poses challenges for law enforcement agencies, which continually strive to keep up with technology-based criminal enterprises; it does more good than harm in the fight against crime. Tech advancements in law enforcement include the following capabilities, which illustrate how quickly things change alongside technology.

Sharing Information
Law enforcement agencies are spread throughout a national criminal justice system that involves, regional, state, and local authorities, each administering their policing efforts independently. Too often in the past, lack of access to timely information prevented various agencies from coordinating their efforts adequately. Advances in the way agencies share information and use criminal identification systems have led to tighter connections between independent law enforcement organizations and universal enforcement standards across jurisdictions. Sharing information about offenders also has a positive preventative impact, helping keep guns out of the hand of dangerous criminals and barring offenders from certain types of employment.

Security and Surveillance Upgrades
Property crimes continue to decrease statistically, so security and video surveillance upgrades have improved public safety dramatically. Camera technology, for example, produces modern models with higher image quality than past versions, and the size of high-quality cameras has also diminished, allowing them to be concealed for covert surveillance. Face-recognition technology is particularly rewarding, enabling law enforcement officials to literally pick faces from crowds.  In fact, the technology is so accurate as to create privacy-rights controversies among those who feel it is too intrusive.

Social Media
Though it is a social trend as much as it is a technological breakthrough, social media use nonetheless furnishes law enforcement advantages for agencies that use the technology effectively. For example, criminals leave trails using social media platforms, so justice agencies turn to Facebook, Twitter and other channels for vital clues and insight into criminal behavior. The technology also enables officers to distribute information directly to concerned citizens, informing them of unfolding crimes and dangerous developments.

Social media links law enforcement directly to the public at large, so it is a great tool for spreading descriptions, videos and other information about criminals. Communicating in real-time closes the crucial gap between the point at which crimes occur and when investigations begin, enabling citizens to respond with timely information.

Crime Mapping Technology
Modern computing power speeds up data analysis and enables law enforcement to track crime trends geographically. What was once accomplished through countless man-hours pouring over data is now a matter of a few mouse clicks. Crime mapping enables agencies to zero-in on problem areas, stepping-up enforcement efforts and assisting in bringing in fugitives. Like highly sophisticated “pin-maps” highlighting crime location, mapping and geographic profiling give enforcement officers clear snapshots of crime trends.

Mobile Technology
Mobile technology furnishes an electronic trail of texts, emails, calls and GPS location information that law enforcement uses to solve cases. Smartphones are so widespread the contact information and other data they contain give officers a starting point for their investigations, which often unfold in arrests directly related to information gleaned from mobile devices and usage. Using advanced digital forensics technology, investigators find links between suspects and their crimes, which might go unnoticed without mobile connections. In addition to investigative benefits, mobile technology speeds communication between officers, agencies and citizens.

Technology will never replace solid investigative work, but modern advances assist law enforcement efforts to stay ahead of criminals. Mobile technology, social media, and rapid access to information contribute to better enforcement and prevention. And crime-mapping and video surveillance breakthroughs also increase public safety, enabling justice agencies to direct resources to where they are needed most.

*Daphne Holmes is a writer from ArrestRecords.com. She can be reached at daphneholmes9@gmail.com.

Opinions expressed in this post are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the Pace Criminal Justice Center or its Board of Advisors.  

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

July 17 is designated as the Day of International Criminal Justice because on July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court, was adopted at a diplomatic conference in Rome.

In a press release on July 10, 2014, the ICC stated that the State Parties to the Rome Statute “decided to commemorate [July 17 as a] unique date, recognising the efforts of the international community to strengthen the emerging system of international criminal justice and to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression.”

The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, upon ratification of 60 countries. At this time, some 120 countries have become parties to the Statute. The Court currently has before it eight situations (all involving countries on the African continent), and the ICC Prosecutor has brought 21 cases relating to those situations. The Prosecutor is conducting preliminary investigations relating to matters in several other countries, including Ukraine.

The ICC Prosecutor has succeeded in convicting two defendants relating to the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One of these convictions (against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) is still on appeal. As noted in a previous post, the other conviction (against Germain Katanga) became final when appeals were terminated on June 25, 2014.

POST WRITTEN BY: Jake B. Sher (’16), Pace Law School

JSher_valle imageIn a recent post, we discussed issues of mens rea as they related to internet search history. Digital communications, however, have also recently come under scrutiny. In the hands of an adroit prosecutor, they are equally as revealing and equally powerful evidence as an individual’s internet search history.  Yet, when the prosecution relies exclusively on online communications to prove a defendant’s mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, a skilled defense team may be able to raise issues surrounding the actual context of the communications that may preclude a conviction.

In an opinion and order issued on June 30, 2014 Judge Paul Gardephe of the Southern District of New York conditionally granted former NYPD Officer Gilberto Valle’s motion for a new trial on his conviction for conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The prosecution relied heavily on a mountain’s worth of digital communications between Valle and his alleged co-conspirators. Unfortunately, none of the evidence against Valle had any corroboration outside of the electronic world, and Valle never finalized any of his alleged “plans.” As a result, Valle’s defense counsel contended that his online activities constituted morbid fantasy role-playing, not conspiracy. The government conceded that some of Valle’s communications were fantastical, but argued that some were manifestations of Valle’s specific intent to commit the alleged crime of kidnapping.

Judge Gardephe observed that “Valle’s depraved, misogynistic … fantasies about his wife, former college classmates, and acquaintances undoubtedly reflect a mind diseased.” United States v. Valle, No. 12 Cr. 847 (PGG), 2014 WL 2980256, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89650 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014). His observation notwithstanding, however, the judge granted Valle’s motion for a new trial. He did so based on the theory that the government neither demonstrated proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Valle’s chats reflected true criminal intent as opposed to fantasy role-play, and that the government’s evidence was insufficient to distinguish the real communications from the conceded fantasy communications. (emphasis added). In Valle, the Court wrote:

Valle’s visits to Internet sites devoted to death, violence, and kidnapping; his possession of images depicting acts of sexual violence against women; his computer searches regarding kidnapping methods; and his 89 computer folders containing Facebook images of women he knew, all graphically illustrate his depraved interests.  The Government did not, however, meet its burden … the Government offered no evidence that would have permitted a reasonable juror to determine whether someone who is truly interested in kidnapping a woman would be more likely to engage in these activities than someone who is merely interested in fantasizing about kidnapping and committing acts of sexual violence against women.

Even digital communications that may appear damningly unassailable require corroboration or further investigation. As Learned Hand once ruminated, “it does not follow, because a jury might have found [the defendant] guilty of the substantive offence, that they were justified in finding him guilty of a conspiracy to commit it.” United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).

Proof of mens rea may require something more than digital evidence alone, even if a jury is convinced of a defendant’s guilt. As a result, the prosecution in Valle fell short of building their case for a conviction as a matter of law, a fact that Valle’s attorneys managed to exploit in floating an argument sufficient to warrant a re-trial.

Cases and Related Readings:

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On June 25, 2014, the Office of the ICC Prosecutor formally established a Scientific Advisory Board to assist the Office in its investigatory and prosecutorial work. The Board will consist of sixteen forensic experts whose task will be to inform the Office of scientific and technological developments helpful to the Prosecutor’s capability to collect and analyze scientific evidence.

The establishment of the Board represents an effort by the Prosecutor’s Office to upgrade the quality of evidence it presents to ICC Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers. In recent years, scholarly commentators have criticized international courts and tribunals, including criminal courts and tribunals, for failing to require and utilize fact findings based on scientific examination.

In its October 11, 2013 Strategic Plan, the Prosecutor’s Office noted that ICC judges were requiring “higher evidentiary standards” and “more and different kinds of evidence” from the Office. In response to this demand, the Plan stated that the Office’s Investigative Division will, among other things,

enhan[ce] its capabilities to collect other forms of evidence … in particular scientific evidence [and will] validat[e] its investigative standards with a panel of international experts.

In a June 27, 2014 press release, the Prosecutor’s Office stated that

[t]he work of the Board will be crucial to the Office’s efforts, as reflected in its new Strategic Plan, to strengthen its investigative capabilities and enhance the quality of its deliverables when it comes to scientific evidence collection and analysis.

In the effort to carry out its mandate under the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor’s Office has to work with limited resources in very difficult environments. It is to be hoped that the establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board will assist the Office in the challenges it faces.

Related Readings:

Commentators criticizing fact applications by international courts, including criminal courts and tribunals:

POST WRITTEN BY: Jake B. Sher (’16), Pace Law School

ImageThe District Attorneys of the Information Age have a new tool at their disposal: the internet search histories of their defendants. Used correctly, this tool can grant unprecedented insight into an individual’s mental state regarding an alleged crime. The most recent debate on the issue involves Justin Ross Harris, whose high-profile case about his son’s death by exposure initially suggested a negligent mens rea at best. Investigators got a hold of the internet search history and cell phone data, finding evidence that Harris was communicating with several women while his son was still alive in the vehicle, and allegedly had looked at websites that advocated against having children. Harris’ acts have subjected him to murder charges.

The use of internet search history to secure a conviction is undoubtedly a powerful tool, and its use is nothing new. For instance, Melanie McGuire’s searches for “how to purchase guns?” and “how to commit murder;” Steven Zirko’s extensive search history, or Jared Lee Loughner’s “assassin” research.

Taken in context, internet searches can give important insights into the mind of the individual conducting the search. Taken out of context, however, a person’s internet search history may result in a wrongful conviction. The Eastern District of Wisconsin granted a prisoner’s habeas corpus petition, releasing him from a life sentence for his wife’s murder where his alleged internet search history for “ethelyne glycol poisoning” occurred on the morning of his wife’s death.  The District Court cast doubt on the reliability of the search history for purposes of determining intent, particularly in the context of letters and reports to police suggesting Mrs. Jensen’s concerns about his internet search history. The District Court determined that the admission of such evidence to the exclusion of evidence suggesting Mrs. Jensen was suicidal and had access to Mr. Jensen’s computer at the time that the internet search occurred constituted a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights:

… viewed in isolation, the State’s computer evidence against Jensen was quite convincing. But that was not the only evidence the jury heard about the computer. The jury also heard Jensen’s statement to one of the investigators in which he denied any knowledge of the searches for poison and claimed that Julie also used the computer and accessed the internet, information that was confirmed by one of Julie’s friends … Jensen told the investigator that the computer was not password protected and that Julie entered information on a financial program called Quicken and was interested in medical information. … The defense pointed out evidence in the internet history of a search for “suicide” on November 10, 2008, which was also the first day on which the word ethylene glycol appears in the internet history.

Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-00803, 2013 WL 6708767, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177420  (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013). (Court’s Official Copy)

Searches by individuals online create inadvertent communication between the searching individual and the corporation owning and operating the search engine. It is important to note that the evidence unearthed from internet data may provide just enough information to obfuscate the truth. As Orin S. Kerr stated with regards to digital evidence,

communications normally will not indicate who or what sent or received them, or the context in which they were sent or received.

While internet search histories are helpful tools for obtaining circumstantial evidence regarding the individual’s state of mind conducting the search, they are imperfect vehicles in that process; courts must balance their admission against the Constitutional Rights of the individual conducting the search. In our continued pursuit of the equitable administration of justice in the Internet Age, the words of Justice Cardozo remain resonant:

When the risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out.

Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).

Related Readings:

Cases:

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

June 25, 2014 marked a significant date in the history of the International Criminal Court; the ICC Prosecutor and the Defense for Germain Katanga discontinued their appeals regarding Katanga’s March 7, 2014 conviction on most (but not all) of the charges against him and his twelve year sentence issued on May 23, 2014. The discontinuance of the appeals in this case means that the judgment and sentence against Katanga are now final. This is the first time such finality has been achieved in a case that the ICC Prosecutor pursued to conviction.

The ICC Prosecutor achieved a conviction on March 14, 2012 against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, and Lubanga was sentenced on July 10, 2012. However, appeals in the Lubanga case are still pending. As noted in a previous post, Germaine Katanga was convicted on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity relating to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In a statement released on June 26, 2014, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said,

This first conviction with finality at the ICC is a clear signal to all those who might seek to perpetrate such crimes, putting them on notice that, sooner or later, justice will be served.

As the next step in the process, the ICC Trial Chamber with responsibility for the Katanga case will consider possible reparations to victims of the crimes for which Germain Katanga was convicted.

Last week, on June 25, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Riley v. California, a decision combining California and Massachusetts cases challenging the warrantless search an arrestee’s cellphone incident to arrest. The Court unanimously concluded that the police are not entitled to search a cell phone incident to arrest without a warrant, absent exigent circumstance, and as such must seek a properly executed warrant to search a cellphone.  This decision was almost instantaneously covered by a number of newspapers, reporters, and bloggers, and we bring you a short compilation of some of the online coverage.

The U.S. Supreme Court Decisions

Pre-Decision Coverage

Post-Decision Newspaper Articles & Blog Posts

Click here, to explore recent (2014 on) scholarly articles on the subject.

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On June 10, the New York Court of Appeals issued a divided opinion in People v. Rivera regarding a criminal defendant’s right to be present during any supplemental instructions the trial court may give to even a single member of the jury. Defendant Rivera was charged with murder and illegal possession of a weapon. While the jury was deliberating, the trial judge informed the attorneys that juror number 11 requested to speak with the court, and the attorneys consented to the judge’s meeting with the juror, with no one else present.

The judge then had a colloquy in the robing room with the juror, who it turned out, wanted further guidance on “imminent danger,” relating to the defendant’s argument that he killed in self-defense. After the colloquy, the judge informed the attorneys and defendant about the meeting and told them that a transcript of the colloquy was available for review. Neither counsel requested a reading of the transcript.

The jury acquitted on the murder charge but found the defendant guilty of the weapons charge. On appeal, the Second Department reversed the conviction on the weapons charge because the defendant was not present during the court’s colloquy with juror number 11.

A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Second Department’s decision and agreed that holding this colloquy in the absence of the defendant was – similar to the recent People v. Walston decision– a violation of CPL § 310.30 and a “mode of proceedings error” that did not require an objection in order to be raised on appeal.

Rivera was a 4-3 decision. Judge Abdus-Salaam wrote an extensive and vigorous dissenting opinion, in which Judges Read and Smith joined. The dissenters opined that, given the facts of the case and the purpose of the presence rule,

the trial court committed a de minimis violation of defendant’s right to be present rather than a mode of proceedings error.

The dissenters cautioned that

[u]nder the majority’s holding, a conscientious defense counsel has every reason to encourage a trial court to conduct insignificant proceedings in the defendant’s absence, knowing that the court’s actions will not meaningfully affect the jury’s consideration of the case and will provide a guaranteed reversal of a conviction on appeal.

The Rivera majority took a strong stand on the “absolute right” of a criminal defendant to be present during all instructions a court provides to the jury. On the other hand, the Rivera dissenters raise the concern that strict application of the “mode of proceedings” doctrine may lead to situations in which defense counsel’s advocacy for the client requires counsel not to object to errors where an objection would otherwise be required.

Rivera and Walston indicate that the Court of Appeals is divided on the scope of CPL § 310.30 and the “mode of proceedings” doctrine. It seems likely that the Court will confront these issues again.

References:

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On June 12, 2014, the New York Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision on the responsibilities of a trial court when a jury sends a note asking for clarification of the court’s instructions on the elements of the crimes presented for the jury’s deliberations.

The appeal arose from a case in which the prosecution charged the defendant with second-degree murder, pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1), which requires proof of intent to kill.  At the close of proof in the case, the trial court, in addition to instructing the jury on the elements of this charge, granted the defense counsel’s request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter, in the event that the jury, pursuant to Penal Law § 125.20(1), found that the defendant’s intent was not to kill the victim but only to cause serious physical injury that unintentionally resulted in the victim’s death.

During its deliberations, the jury sent the judge the following note: “Power Point – Judges directions on Manslaughter/Murder in the Second Degree -(Intent).” The judge did not present the jury’s note to the parties (apparently receiving no request to do so), but simply informed them that the jury was requesting “the Judge’s directions on manslaughter and murder in the second degree.” Of particular importance in this case is that the judge did not inform counsel of the note’s reference to intent. When the judge called the jury to the courtroom to hear his response to the note, the judge said that he understood them to be asking merely for a read-back of the instructions on the elements of charges at issue, and the judge repeated these instructions.

The jury acquitted defendant on the murder charge but found him guilty on the manslaughter charge. In rendering this verdict, the jury had to make a crucial decision about the defendant’s intent. Their verdict implied that they found that the defendant’s intent was not to kill but to cause serious physical injury.

The Defense appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by not informing counsel of the jury note’s reference to intent. The Court of Appeals agreed. The Court noted that Criminal Procedure Law § 310.30 requires that when the trial court receives a request from the jury “for further instruction or information with respect to the law,” the court must give notice of the content of the request to the People and the defense. The Court stated that under its precedent in People v. O’Rama, 579 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991), this notice must be “meaningful,” so that the defense is able “to evaluate the inquiry and the proper responses in light of the defendant’s interests.” Id. at 192. The O’Rama court stated that

[a] court can neither serve the goal of maximizing counsel’s participation nor satisfy the CPL 310.30 requirement that meaningful notice be given when counsel is not afforded a verbatim account of a juror’s communication and is thereby deprived of an advance opportunity to suggest a response.

Id. at 193. Following this precedent, the Court held that the trial judge’s conduct with respect to the jury note, omitting specific reference to the intent issue, failed to satisfy this obligation. Moreover, because the Court deemed this a failure of the trial court’s “core responsibilities” relating to the court’s “mode of proceedings,” the Court held that under O’Rama an objection by defense counsel was not required to preserve the issue for appeal.

The Court vacated the defendant’s manslaughter conviction, with leave to the People to resubmit that charge to a grand jury.

Judge Robert Smith concurred in the result, while stating some misgivings that excusing the preservation requirement in such a case may provide defense counsel with a tactical opportunity to avoid seeking full disclosure to counsel of the contents of a juror note in hopes of a future reversal of the conviction. He suggested that a future case might raise and brief the issue of the scope and validity of the “mode of proceedings” doctrine and afford the Court with an opportunity to reconsider and revise of this doctrine.

References:

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